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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The governance of international migration in the context of decentralization is somewhat 
awkward. Debate occurs, particularly on the issue of whether it is a decentralized or 
centralized matter. It is debatable because overseas employment lies both in the area of 
employment and foreign affairs. Law No. 32/2004 concerning Regional Governance 
stipulates that employment is a decentralized matter, while foreign affairs are not.  
 
Yet, the governance of Indonesia’s overseas employment is characterized with centralistic 
approach. One can obvious see it from the following angles. First, the ones in favor of 
centralistic governance usually make use of Article 33 and 34 of Law No. 13/2003 concerning 
Labor (Naekma and Pageh, 2009). These articles differentiate domestic employment from the 
overseas employment, leaving the latter to be regulated by another law, which is Law No. 
39/2004 concerning the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (PPTKI). 
Based on these provisions, these people then argue that domestic employment is 
decentralizable while overseas employment is not. 
 
Second, the establishment of a vertical body as the operator of placement and protection of 
migrant workers reinforces the position of the central government that the governance of 
overseas employment is more of a centralistic matter. 2 BNP2TKI (National Agency for the 
Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers) has representative office, the so-
called Service Center on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
(BP3TKI), in 19 migrant source provinces. It has no representative at the kabupaten 
(districts)/kota (municipality) level, except in 14 selected kabupaten/kota (BNP2TKI, 2011). 3 
Moreover, the PPTKI law itself is never clear about the relationship between BP3TKI and the 
provincial and kabupaten/kota governments. 
 
Third, Article 10 of PPTKI law authorizes the placement of Indonesian migrants to PPTKIS 
(private recruitment agency) and article 82 states that the preplacement protection is the 
responsibility of PPTKIS. 4 Meanwhile 90% of PPTKIS is located in Jakarta. According to 
PPTKI law and Government Regulation No. 38/2007 concerning Division of Affairs between 
                                                      
1 Palmira Permata Bachtiar is a senior researcher at SMERU Research Institute 
2 BNP2TKI is one of the mandates of PPTKI law. It was established in 2007 with Presidential Regulation No. 
81/2006 concerning the Establishment of BNP2TKI 
3 BNP2TKI’s representative office at the provincial level is called Service Center on the Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BP3TKI). At the selected kabupaten/kota, the small office is called 
Service Post on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (P4TKI) 
4 About 90% of total annual placement is the one organized by PPTKIS under Private to Private contract 
arrangement. The rest is by BNP2TKI under Government to Government contract arrangement 
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National and Subnational Governments, the responsibilities of issuing PPTKIS’ permit and 
licensing is all in the hand of central government.  
 
However, the decentralistic governance of emigration is also justified for several reasons. First, 
BNP2TKI (2009) admitted that 80% of problems facing the migrant workers occur 
domestically. Big problems such as identity fraud, cheat, extortion, detention, etc. happen at 
the local level and can be more effectively handled by the local government.  
 
Second, one of the tangible gains of emigration is the remittance whose impact is more 
influential at the local level rather than the national level. At the same time, the pain of 
emigration is also more significantly experienced locally. It is, therefore, in the best interest of 
the local government to pursue good emigration governance to maximize the advantages and 
minimize the disadvantages of emigration. 
 
 
1.2. Research Objectives  
 
The research combines desk review and fieldwork with the following objectives: 
a) To analyze the nature of the decentralization of the emigration governance; 
b) To construct a typology of various perda (local regulation) related to overseas employment 
which are the kabupaten’s/kota’s initiatives; 
c) To conduct mapping analysis of perda related to overseas employment; and 
d) To assess the enabling conditions under which some kabupaten/kota are able to pass 
protection perda for their migrant workers. 
 
 
1.3. Research Methodology 
 
This qualitative research includes the following activities: 
 
Documents and literature review. A series of national laws and regulations related to 
emigration and decentralization are reviewed to get the overall picture of international 
migration governance and to understand the nature of authority transfer. 
 
Construction of typology of perda. Perda related to overseas employment at the local level are 
collected from various online sources. 5 Furthermore, mapping analysis of various types of 
perda helps understand the relationship between number of perda and number of migrant 
workers at the kabupaten level. The number of migrant workers in each kabupaten/kota is 
aggregated from the 2005 Village Potential Census. 
 
Field work in four kabupaten. These four kabupaten are purposively chosen to examine the 
policy process behind the existence of nonexistence of perda focusing on migrant protection. 
East Java and West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) were picked out as both are migrant source 
provinces. Kabupaten Blitar of East Java province and Lombok Barat of NTB are kabupaten 
with a protection perda. Meanwhile, their neighboring kabupaten, Kabupaten Ponorogo and 
Lombok Tengah have the draft of protection perda but rejected to be realized as protection 
perda.  
 
                                                      
5(i) http://gudanghukumindonesia.blogspot.com/; (ii) http://www.kppod.org/; (iii) http://www.legalitas.org/. 
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The initial part of the fieldwork involved in depth interview with local government officials, 
local NGOs, migrant workers’ associations, and private recruitment agents. At the village 
level, prospective migrant workers, former migrants, or their families were invited to discuss 
the emigration issues they encounter in focus group discussions (FGDs). Interviews were also 
carried out with private recruitment agencies and migrant workers experiencing abuse—either 
prior to departure, during work, or after arrival in Indonesia. FGD is also held at the 
kabupaten level. Thus, in total, the fieldwork in the four kabupaten involved 12 FGDs (per 
kabupaten: two with migrant workers and one with stakeholders at the kabupaten level). 
 
 
1. 4. Limitation of the Research 
 
Having the level of analysis at kabupaten/kota level, this research did not include problematic 
perda passed at the provincial level. Moreover, in the absence of official copy of perda, the 
research relied only on the list of of perda related to overseas employment available online. In 
reality, there are some hundreds of them issued at the kabupaten/kota level. However, only 127 
perda could be obtained. Our findings, then, only indicate the characteristic of the reported 
perda. Furthermore, the current status of these online perda online is not regularly updated. 
However, since our purpose is only to map and classify all ever-made perda related to overseas 
employment, the current status becomes of less importance. Equally important to notice is 
that the research did not observe the implementation of the perda. Instead, it only focused on 
their textual analysis of perda which is considered to be important lesson learned for other 
migrant-source kabupaten/kota wishing to prepare the protection perda. 
 
 
1.5. Structure of the report 
 
Chapter 2 discusses more detailed information on local government’s roles and responsibilities 
according to PPTKI law and to Government Regulation No. 38/2007. Chapter 3 covers the 
typology of perda related to overseas employment along with the mapping analysis. Chapter 4 
summarizes the findings of the field work focusing on the legal drafting process and drawing 
some lessons learned on the enabling conditions under which perda could be passed in 
Kabupaten Blitar and Lombok Barat. 
 
 
II. NATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Local Government’s Responsibilities in PPTKI Law  
 
The principle criticism against the PPTKI law deals with its bias towards placement rather 
than the protection of migrant workers. The law reflects that emigration is regarded by the 
government simply as a business matter, and, therefore, the placement of as many migrant 
workers as possible is what is desired. Lack of protection within the law is obvious for the 
following reasons. 
 
Out of 109 articles of the law, only one chapter of eight articles (article 77 - 84) deals with 
protection. Although article 77 of the law defines protection as preplacement, placement, and 
postplacement, the rest of the provisions basically perceives protection in terms of placement 
period overseas (see article 78 – 81) and obligates the workers to pay for assistance and 
protection program (see articles 83 - 84). In terms of preplacement, the law assigns the private 
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recruitment agency to be the one in charge of (article 82). The postplacement protection 
remains untouched.  
 
Preplacement protection against extortion and exploitation has not been well elaborated by 
PPTKI law. Article 39 instructs private recruitment agencies to bear all costs except stated 
otherwise.  However, Article 76 (1) and (2) of the PPTKI law state that private recruitment 
agencies can charge the costs of (i) processing identity documents; (ii) health and 
psychological tests; (iii) job training and professional certificate; and (iv) “others”. The term 
“others” is then explained by Permenakertrans  No. PER.14/MEN/X/2010 to be (i) visa; (ii) 
food and accommodation during training; (iii) airfares; (iv) airport tax; (v) local transportation 
to the training center/shelter; (vi) insurance premium; and, last but not least, (vi) agency 
service fee. Furthermore, Article 76 (3) of the law says that these costs must be administered 
transparently. No one could guarantee that the PPTKIS do not overcharge migrant workers, 
unless there exist effective supervision and proper sanction by the government. 
 
Unfortunately, clear provision of supervision against the private recruitment agencies has been 
particularly missing in the law. This is so because of several reasons. First, PPTKI law is 
inconclusive with the institutions in charge of supervision roles. Article 92 (1) states that 
governments at all levels, including local government are responsible for supervision, while 
article 95 says BNP2TKI. Meanwhile the delineation authority between governments at all 
levels and BNP2TKI is far from clear. Moreover, this triggers question of whether supervision 
fund is also shared to kabupaten/kota where BNP2TKI has no representative, expect small 
posts only in 14 kabupaten. 
 
Second, provisions for supervision (article 92(3)) is yet to be completed. The very article 
promise to further elaboration of supervision provision in the government regulation. Seven 
years have passed, the promise was never materialized. Similarly, supervisory mechanism – 
being the responsibilities of government at all levels – is stipulated generally in article 93 and 
whose details is assured to be specified in ministerial regulation. Again, until now, the details 
have not been made in any of the ministerial regulations. 
 
Third, supervision becomes more difficult to carry out at the kabupaten/kota level due to article 
23 stipulating that the headquarters of PPTKIS is the one bearing the responsibilities of the 
branch office. Meanwhile vast majority of PPTKIS operate the business from Jakarta, some of 
them establish branches at the kabupaten/kota. This provision makes it difficult for local 
government to prosecute the violating branch office. 
 
 
2.2. Intergovernmental Responsibilities  
 
Being one of the implementing regulations of Law No. 32/2004, Government Regulation No. 
38/2007 assigns certain authorities to the national as well as subnational governments. 
Assessment of this regulation can be summarized as follows.  
 
First, centralistic characteristics can be seen from the domination of major responsibilities at 
central level. These responsibilities are related to placement procedure rather than the 
protection of the workers. For example, at the central level, the official procedure related to 
the PPTKIS includes the issuance of (i) private recruitment agency license (SIPPTKIS), (ii) 
recruitment recommendation, and (iii) mobilization permit (SIP), as well as (iv) the 
appointment of insurance companies, banks, and medical clinics. On the other hand, the 
procedure related to the workers incorporates the issuance of KTKLN; computerized data 
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system of overseas employment (SISKO TKLN); and final predeparture briefing (PAP). 
These are the areas where both Kemnakertrans and BNP2TKI are interested in. 
 
Second, the above placement procedure has little to do with protection. On the other hand, there 
are areas where placement procedure overlaps with protection and is apparently not the area 
where power struggle at the central level exists. These areas include the (i) formulation of bilateral 
and multilateral agreements, (ii) setting up of working contract standard, and (iii) setting up of the 
standard of shelters and training centers for overseas employment (BLK-LN). 
 
Third, Government Regulation No. 38/2007 takes protection fee (of US$15/worker) 
seriously, as the supervision of protection fee compliance takes place at all levels, even at the 
kabupaten/kota level. In reality, these local governments have nothing to do with and cannot 
access the data of this fee. 
 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007 also assigns the local government to support the roles of 
the central government. Comparing the responsibilities stipulated by Law No. 39/2004 and 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007, one can see that the latter is more extended than the 
former. 6 Some local government responsibilities outlined in Government Regulation No. 
38/2007 are indeed the responsibilities of the PPTKIS as per Law No. 39/2004, while some 
other responsibilities are not mentioned in Law No. 39/2004. Thus, we can divide the 
responsibilities outlined in Government Regulation No. 38/2007 into three categories (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Division of Local Government’s Responsibilities according to Government 
Regulation No. 38/2007 
(a) Responsibilities which are 
consistent with Law No. 39/2004 
(b) Responsibilities which are 
inconsistent (mentioned as the 
PPTKIS’ responsibilities in Law 
No. 39/2004) 
(c) Additional responsibilities 
(not mentioned in Law No. 
39/2004) 
Registration (Article 36, 37 of the 
law)  
Registration (A. 22 of the law)  Facilitation of bilateral and 
multilateral 
agreementsimplementation 
Supervision of recruitment (A. 92 
of the law)  
Information dissemination (A. 22 
of the law)  
Information dissemination 
regarding SISKO TKLN and 
supervision of protection fee 
(USD15) compliance 
Permit to establish a PPTKIS 
branch office (A. 21, A. 37 of the 
law)  
Selection of the workers (A. 22 of 
the law)  
Socialization of the content of work 
and placement contracts 
Passport recommendation (A. 51 
of the law)  
Home return service (A. 75 of the 
law)  
Assessment and validation of 
placement contracts  
Permit to establish a PPTKIS 
shelter (A. 70 of the law)  
  
Assistance, supervision, 
monitoring (A. 92 of the law)  
  
Source: Government Regulation No. 38/2007 and Law No. 39/2004. 
                                                      
6 (i) to have the prospective workers registered (Article 36); (ii) to be informed of the existence of a placement 
contract (Article 38); (iii) to get a copy of the placement contract (Article 54); (iv) to have the private recruitment 
agencies registered (Article 37); to give recommendation for passport application of the workers (Article 51 (f)); 
(v) to assist in mediating between disputing parties (Article 85); (vi) to supervise the placement and protection of 
migrant workers (Article 92) and (vii) to submit the supervisory mechanism to the minister (Article 93); and (viii) 
investigation of violations: to act as an investigator in case of a violation (Article 101). 
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Critical questions about these findings are twofold: (i) Are local governments aware of and 
committed to their extended responsibilities? (ii) Are they capable of carrying out these 
responsibilities? 
 
 
2.3 Policy Gap and Support for Local Government’s Initiatives 
 
Many NGOs view that Law No. 32/2004 concerning Regional Governance is sufficient to 
back up the idea of transferring power, finance, and administration to the kabupaten/kota 
government. Since employment is an obligatory matter for the kabupaten/kota government 
(Article 14 (1) of the law), it must not disregard the protection of overseas workers. Both the 
domestic and overseas workers are citizens of Indonesia and are no different in terms of 
rights. The kabupaten/kota government is obliged to give them service and protection while 
they are still in its jurisdiction. 
 
Furthermore, it is definitely not recommended to delay the protection of migrant workers 
until the national policy becomes perfect. Instead, improvements at the national and local 
levels have to be made side by side. Local initiatives have a great potential to fill in the existing 
national policy gaps in terms of protection, particularly the preplacement protection. 
Protection perda is needed for the following reasons. First, a perda can elaborate and specify 
local governments’ and responsibilities in line with the mandate of the PPTKI law and 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007. 
 
Second, a perda can state specific needs of the kabupaten/kota which cannot be accommodated 
in the PPTKI law. Such issues as main destination and cost structure are locally specific; 
therefore, a perda can deal with these issues. For example, the majority of migrant workers 
from Kabupaten Lombok Barat and Lombok Tengah work in Malaysia and the Middle East, 
while their fellow migrant workers from Kabupaten Blitar and Ponorogo work in East Asia. 
With such locally specific conditions, the perda of these kabupaten can specifically stipulate the 
cost structure in the destination country where their migrant workers work. 
 
Third, the process of drafting protection perda involves civil society organizations and, 
therefore, enhances democratization. The participation of NGOs and academicians reveals 
one step towards improvement in governance. From a policy perspective, more interaction 
between civil society organizations, the local government, the local parliament, and the private 
sector will result in a better power balance. 
 
Fourth, a perda can clearly stipulate sanctions against violations which take place at the 
kabupaten/kota level. A perda can act as a form of shock therapy for any party that is 
accustomed to extorting, abusing, and detaining migrant workers prior to their departure. 
With strong law enforcement, the protection of migrant workers would certainly improve. 
 
Finally, the dilemma between having and not having a protection perda lies in the fact that, 
empirically speaking, the implementation of perda and its law enforcement have been far from 
sufficient. We should ask the question thus: Should we establish a normative law or should we 
cling to the evidence and abandon the idea of having a perda? Based on the four reasons 
mentioned earlier, we should bring the establishment of perda to the fore. Lack of 
implementation, however, is not a problem that can be solved overnight. It can only be solved 
slowly but surely. The ultimate desire for establishing a protection perda is that, in the long run, 
it can serve as the guide for civil society behaviors and attitudes that respect migrant workers. 
Therefore, we should not leave the idea of passing protection perda until the lack of 
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implementation is solved. If Indonesians do not respect their fellow citizens working abroad, 
what kind of treatment do we expect Indonesian migrant workers will receive in their 
destination countries? 
 
 
III. TYPOLOGY AND MAPPING ANALYSIS OF PERDA RELATED TO 
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT 
 
3.1 Regional Autonomy and Perda on Taxes and Retribusi7 
 
The decentralization framework is centered around political, administrative, and fiscal matters 
which are explained in two very important laws: Law No. 32/2004 concerning Regional 
Governance and Law No. 33/204 concerning Fiscal Balance. In political and administrative 
matters, local governments have to assume the responsibility to provide public services, 
including employment. In financial and fiscal matters, a certain budget allocation is granted to 
local governments based on a set of determined criteria. 
 
These two pillars are backed with various implementing regulations. According to Mahi 
(2002), one of the most important supports is Law No. 34/2000 concerning Local Taxes and 
Retribusi (PDRD). Law No. 34/2000 allowed for a flexibility of local governments in 
generating their local revenue. By passing perda, local governments can impose taxes and 
retribusi even without the approval of the central government. 
 
However, having the objectives of maximizing the revenue, rather than optimizing it, every 
kabupaten/kota government tends to make the best use of Law No. 34/2000 by formulating 
perda on taxes and retribusi at the cost of long-term investment. Coupled with the euphoria of 
autonomy, the open-list nature of Law No. 34/2000, apparently, has given room to local 
governments to exercise their power. Moreover, the freedom to issue the perda to increase 
local revenue has been misunderstood by local governments as a symbol of independence 
from the central government (Mawardi et al., 2009). Meanwhile, opportunities for them to 
work together in one free economic zone and formulate a common economic policy have 
been so far almost out of the question. These will eventually obstruct local investment, create 
high cost economy, reduce Indonesia’ competitiveness, and weaken the nation’s integrity 
(Soesastro, 2001). At the same time, the span of control of the central government against the 
so-called problematic perda is notoriously weak, particularly in the context of 524 
kabupaten/kota.8 
 
The era of 2000s saw a booming of problematic perda and was considered one of the side 
effects of decentralization on business enabling environment. The phenomenon of 
problematic perda has been intensively discussed and has become a national concern. Business 
communities have heavily complained, urging the central government to cancel these perda. 
Indeed, these perda encompass cross-sectoral taxes and charges ranging from agriculture, trade, 
industry, transportation, communication, employment, etc. In general, they might appear as 
perda on excessive business license, perda on goods and services distribution, and perda on 
general administration fees (Bachtiar et al., 2009). Many times, the business communities have 
                                                      
7 Retribusi is officially a user charge that is collected as payment in return for a service. However, on the ground, 
it includes other nontax charges collected by the government. 
8Latest data from Directorate General of Fiscal Balance, Ministry of Finance (http://www.djpk. depkeu.go.id 
/datadjpk/72/). 
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to pay double taxes horizontally (across different sectors) and vertically (at the central and 
local levels). 
 
The central government has been reprimanded for slow action to revoke problematic perda 
that clearly distort the investment climate. The speed of cancellation cannot keep up with the 
speed of issuing new perda. After many years of pros and cons, in late 2009, the parliament 
finally passed Revision of Law No. 34/2000, which was Law No. 28/2009 concerning PDRD. 
Unlike Law No. 34/2000, Law No. 28/2009 employs a closed-list system where only the listed 
taxes and retribusi are allowed to be imposed locally. Moreover, kabupaten/kota governments 
should seek assistance and approval from the provincial government before issuing new perda. 
Two years have been given to kabupaten/kota governments to terminate the problematic perda 
which are not within the list of the new law. 
 
 
3.2 Typology of Perda Related to Overseas Employment 
 
Being one of the decentralized responsibilities, employment is also the area where 
kabupaten/kota governments can possibly extract levies. Although this violates the law, many 
local governments insist on collecting them. Particularly for migrant-source kabupaten/kota, the 
tendency to levy is very high. 
 
The local government can levy migrant workers in various ways. First, it can levy them directly 
through administration fees (i) when they do official registration as employment seekers and 
(ii) when they ask for official recommendation to be attached in passport application. Second, 
it can also levy them indirectly through the PPTKIS. In running its operation, a PPTKIS must 
get approval from the local government. The approval appears as a recommendation letter, 
such as (i) recommendation to acquire a business license, (ii) recommendation to recruit 
workers, (iii) recommendation to establish training center, and (iv) recommendation to 
establish dormitory. Some kabupaten/kota might also impose placement fee to the PPTKIS. 
One should know that charging the PPTKIS means charging the migrant workers. In the 
absence of accountability, the former will simply transfer all the costs (and most probably with 
profit) to the latter. 
 
The majority of perda related to overseas employment are about charges and fees. They are 
formulated rather generally and are not specific about overseas employment. In addition, there 
are also specific perda on overseas employment, which are established by migrant-source 
kabupaten/kota. These are perda without the spirit of extracting levies. On this ground, we offer 
the typology with two general types: nonspecific (extractive) and specific (nonextractive) perda. 
Specifically, perda related to overseas employment can be grouped into four types of perda 
(Figure 2). 
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aTitle of perda does not specifically mention overseas employment. 
bTitle of perda specifically mentions overseas employment. 
Figure 2 Typology of perda related to overseas employment 
Source: Author's framework 
 
Perda on general employment (type 1) focuses on charges imposed on general employment, 
including overseas employment.9 These charges are paid either by the workers or by the 
companies. Some kabupate/kotan differentiate perda that charges the workers (perda on 
employment service charges) from perda that charges the companies (perda on licensing 
charges).10 However, the majority of kabupate/kotan just combine the two in one perda. Type-1 
perda are mostly issued by migrant-source kabupaten/kota. Possible titles of type-1 perda are 
perda on employment, perda on employment services, perda on employment charges.  
 
Perda on general kabupaten/kota revenue (type 2) relates to possible revenues that the 
kabupaten/kota can generate, including those from overseas employment. It is formulated more 
generally than type-1 perda. Charges in type-2 perda are paid by the citizens and various 
business communities, migrant workers, and PPTKIS. Possible titles of type-2 perda are perda 
on third party contributions, perda on administration fees, perda on legalization fee, and perda 
on all other revenues. 
 
Perda on placement procedure (type 3) deals with overseas employment procedure. It does not 
rule any financial consequences, neither to the migrant workers nor to the PPTKIS. Although 
                                                      
9Perda on general employment might initially intend to protect employees, for example, against work termination, 
violation of minimum wage, etc. However, many of them end up with extractive nature which is implied in the 
article on cost structure or the article that assures further arrangement on another local regulation. These articles 
are usually placed at the end of the perda. 
10Perda on general employment stipulates charges for various services, such as permit on overtime, registration of 
employment contract, legalization of company rules, facilitation on labor welfare, supervision of work safety, etc. 
These perda always put protection as the rationale for charges they impose. However, the services in return are 
those within the responsibilities of the local government and, therefore, they should be provided free of charge 
(Pambudhi, 2003). 
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in some cases, the title explicitly mentions the protection of migrant workers, the content 
regulates the placement procedure heavily and, therefore, this type is categorized separately 
from type-4 perda. Type-3 perda tends to only duplicate the substance of the PPTKI law and, 
therefore, it does not fill the policy gap. Indeed, the presence of type-3 perda is rather 
unnecessary because placement procedures have been regulated nationally. 
 
Perda on protection (type 4) are concerned with the protection of migrant workers. It does not 
entail any charge and concentrates on what have not been ruled in the national law. Protection 
perda mandates the establishment of a protection commission: a specialized body which 
expedites the handling of abuse and extortion cases, mediating between various stakeholders, 
and issuing warnings when violations against migrant workers’ rights occur. 
 
Type-1 and type-2 perda intend to secure local revenues. However, since they charge what they 
should not or they charge more than they should, these perda are considered problematic. 
Certainly, this is a violation of the old law (Law No. 34/2000) and even more of the new law 
(Law No. 28/2009). Many of these perda have been cancelled by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(Kemdagri) on the ground that they go against the spirit of local governments welcoming 
investment.11 However, in reality, efforts for the cancellation face enormous difficulties. 
Obtaining copies of perda for legal examination is not easy since the kabupaten/kota do not 
send them to Jakarta. In fact, kabupaten/kota tend to hide them.12 Also, the task of reviewing 
perda produced by a total of 524 kabupaten/kota is a task that is next to impossible.13 Moreover, 
many local governments still disobey the order to cancel the perda. They might cancel the perda 
but issue lower legal products with the same content of the cancelled perda. Because of all 
these difficulties, not surprisingly, the existence of type-1 and type-2 perda is still pervasive. 
The spirit of giving protection to the migrant workers is, therefore, severely weakened by the 
enthusiasm of the local government to levy against the placement of overseas employment. 
 
The similarity of type-3 and type-4 perda is that both do not discuss anything about financial 
consequence that the migrant workers or the PPTKIS have to bear. However, their difference 
is that the former focuses more on placement procedure, while the latter on the protection of 
migrant workers. This is reflected in the proportion of articles and the provision of placement 
in comparison with those of protection, as well as the mandate to establish Protection 
Commission. 
 
 
3.3 Mapping Analysis 
 
Table 2 underlines the following findings. First, in general, there exists a correlation between 
kabupaten/kota having perda related to overseas employment and kabupaten/kota having a large 
number of migrant workers. In Q1, only 14 out of the 84 kabupaten/kota issued perda related to 
overseas employment, while in Q5, 36 out of the 82 kabupaten/kota issued these perda. This 
implies that the more migrant workers a kabupaten/kota has, the more likely it produces perda 
related to overseas employment. In total, compared to the rest of the Qs, Q5 kabupaten/kota, 
which are the migrant-source kabupaten/kota, produced more perda, both in terms of quantity 
and variation. 
                                                      
11Much hope is put in the implementation of closed-list system under Law No. 28/2009. Since the law explicitly 
stipulates the allowed perda, the local governments, therefore, cannot issue any perda outside the allowed ones. 
12This was the experience of the research team in Kabupaten Ponorogo. 
13The Asia Foundation’s study found that in 2002 alone, 635 perda were passed in 40 research areas. This means 
that on average, every kabupaten produces about 16 perda per year (Satriyo et al., 2003). 
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Table 2. Kabupaten/Kota with Perda Related to Overseas Employment: Indicative 
Numbers of Perda and Migrant Workers 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Σ  Kabupaten/Kota = 418a 84 84 84 84 82 
Σ Migrant workers in each 
kabupaten/kota issuing perdab 
0−22 36−174 232−802 945−3,534 4,202−57,067 
Σ Kabupaten/kota issuing perda related 
to overseas employment = 115 
14 21 20 25c 35c 
 
Σ Kabupaten/kota issuing type-1 
perda 
12 20 19 23 23 
 
Σ Kabupaten/kota issuing type-2 
perda 
2 1 1 3 11 
 
Σ Kabupaten/kota issuing type-3 
perda 
0 0 0 0 3 
 
Σ Kabupaten/kota issuing type-4 
perda 
0 0 0 0 3 
Σ Perda related to overseas employment 
= 127 
16 23 20 28 40 
 
Σ Type-1 perda 14 22 19 25 23 
 
Σ Type-2 perda 2 1 1 3 11 
 
Σ Type-3 perda 0 0 0 0 3 
 
Σ Type-4 perda 0 0 0 0 3 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the 2005 Podes and reported perda available on the website of (i) KPPOD.org; (ii) 
gudanghukum.org; and (iii) legalitas.or.id. 
aThe number of kabupaten/kota is according to the 2005 Podes. 
bData on the number of migrant workers in each kabupaten/kota is taken from the 2005 Podes. 
cSome kabupaten/kota issue more than one perda of the same type, while some others issue more than one perda of 
different types (see Table 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of perda according to their types 
Note: n = number of perda = 127. 
Second, Figure 3 demonstrates that out of the 127 perda, only 3 perda (2.4%) deal with 
protection (type-4 perda). The majority (81.1%) fall in type-1 perda, while 14.2% belong to type-
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2 perda. Moreover, only 3 kabupaten/kota (3.7%) out of the total 82 migrant-source 
kabupaten/kota in Q5 have protection perda. Meanwhile, 34 kabupaten/kota (41.5%) of the Q5 
kabupaten/kota are more interested in passing extractive perda. Indeed, awareness and 
willingness of local governments to take the initiative to protect their migrant workers is still 
far from adequate. 
 
Third, surprisingly, many kabupaten/kota which have few overseas workers (Q1 to Q3) pass 
type-1 and type-2 perda. The extreme case is that perda related to overseas employment is 
issued even by Q1 kabupaten/kota that do not have any overseas workers, such as Kabupaten 
Berau of East Kalimantan and Kabupaten Murung Raya of Central Kalimantan. These two 
kabupaten are located close to the border with Malaysia and Brunei and have become migrant 
workers’ transit areas. 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of corresponding provinces of Q1 kabupaten/kota 
Note: n = number of kabupaten/kota = 14. 
Figure 4 highlights the corresponding provinces of Q1 kabupaten/kota that are well known to 
be the transit areas where people from all over Indonesia cross the borders. At transit areas, 
the prospective migrant workers and the PPTKIS would require various administrative 
services from the local governments. In addition, irregular/undocumented /illegal migration 
activity that involves making fake identity documents take place in these areas. Considering 
this potential, the kabupaten/kota governments issue perda to impose charges to the migrant 
workers and agencies. Porous borders of Indonesia to neighboring countries such as Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Brunei explain why kabupaten/kota with few migrant workers issue perda related 
to overseas employment. 
 
Another explanation comes from domestic migration since type-1 and type-2 perda are also 
applicable to kabupaten/kota with domestic migrant workers. Kabupaten/kota in Kalimantan 
where mining companies are located, such as Kota Bontang and Kabupaten Kutai Timur, are 
areas attracting workers from other parts of Indonesia, particularly from Java. Local 
governments in these kabupaten/kota would also be eager to levy domestic migrant workers. 
Because of these features, type-1 and type-2 perda tend to spread in the kabupaten/kota 
regardless of the number of overseas migrant workers. 
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Extractive perda which charge the workers for administrative services are against Presidential 
Regulation No. 36/2002 concerning the Ratification of ILO Convention No. 88 concerning 
the Organization of the Employment Service. In general, Article 6 (b) of the law instructs the 
government at all levels to speed up workers’ mobility domestically and internationally. In 
more detail, Article 38 (1) of Law No. 13/2003 concerning Labor states that government 
institutions as well as PPTKIS are not to charge any fees to workers directly or indirectly. 
Collecting levies from workers also violates Law No. 28/2009. The local government is 
responsible for providing regular services to the workers free of charge as the reflection of its 
accountability to its citizens. 
 
Fourth, the typology we made is not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some kabupaten/kota issue 
more than one perda. Kota Bontang, Kabupaten Kutai Timur, Bolaang Mangondow, 
Bengkulu, Donggala, and Sukoharjo, legislated two perda of type 1. Meanwhile, Kabupaten 
Dompu, Bima, Jember, Sumbawa, Cianjur, and Lombok Barat established two perda of 
different types. What is striking is that having the ultimate protection perda does not 
necessarily mean not having extractive perda. Apparently, kabupaten/kota that pass protection 
perda do not cancel their extractive perda. Sumbawa and Lombok Barat are kabupaten with 
protection perda but also with extractive and specialized perda. Therefore, the kabupaten/kota 
may protect their migrant workers in some ways but, at the same time, not in other ways by 
violating the law and taxing the workers, directly or indirectly. The only mutually exclusive 
case is Kabupaten Blitar, which only passes protection perda and none of the extractive types. 
 
 
IV. POLICY PROCESS OF PROTECTION PERDA: TO HAVE OR NOT 
TO HAVE 
 
4.1 The Legal Drafting Process of Perda in the Research Kabupaten 
 
4.1.1 Kabupaten Blitar 
 
The perda of Kabupaten Blitar that governs migrant workers went through a long process. The 
initiative started in 2003 when some NGOs, with the support of UNIFEM, raised the idea of 
formally protecting migrant workers from Blitar through a perda. The two main NGOs were 
Blitar Migrant Workers’ Association (SBMB) and Association for Women and Migrant 
Workers (P3BM). Other NGOs involved were the Post Institute, Lapesdam NU, and Sitas 
Desa. 
 
The process was interrupted for some time due to the 2004 national elections and the 
kabupaten election in 2005. In 2006, the parliament, in particular Commission IV in charge of 
labor, agreed to embrace this idea and intensified the legal drafting process. 
 
In early 2008, the Blitar parliament agreed to include the draft perda (raperda) on migrant 
workers into the local legislation program (prolegda). Entering the 2008 Prolegda meant that the 
raperda would be discussed by the parliament and had to be legislated by 2008. A special 
committee was then formed to thoroughly discuss the raperda submitted by the NGOs. After 
several meetings with various stakeholders, the parliament approved the perda on December 
17, 2008. The day after, on the international migrant day, which was on December 18, 2008, 
the bupati signed Perda No. 16/2008 concerning the Protection of Indonesian Migrant 
Workers in Foreign Countries. 
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After the signing and numbering of the perda, the legislating process should have been 
continued with the recording of the perda in the kabupaten legislation book. However, this was 
not done by the kabupaten secretary.14 Consequently, the perda could not be enforced. This 
certainly was ironic because in August 2009, the Blitar parliament won the autonomy award 
from the Jawa Post Institute of Proautonomy (JPIP). The Institute regarded the Blitar 
parliament as having good initiatives in passing perda on the protection of migrant workers. 
 
The reluctance to fully legislate the perda roots back to the fact that the perda came from the 
parliament’s initiative. The executive, in this case the head of the Disnakertrans, felt somehow 
excluded in the discussion.15 An NGO activist that was interviewed denied this complaint. 
According to him, the kabupaten agency was always invited to the meetings. This problem 
occurred because during the policy process, which took place from 2003 to 2008, the head of 
the Disnakertrans changed several times. As a result, the successors felt left behind in the 
process.16 
 
Furthermore, the Disnakertrans at the kabupaten level argued that the perda had some 
substantial flaws. This was corroborated by the official letter of the Governor of East Java 
following their assessment of the substance of Blitar’s perda.17 The letter recommended that 
the title of the perda be changed by taking into account the substance of the perda, mostly 
covering protection commission. Therefore, in their opinion, the proper title of the perda 
should have been “Protection Commission”. 
 
Following the provincial assessment, legal analysis was also carried out at the kabupaten level. 
Widiarto (2010) presented some findings against the perda. First, the title of the perda was 
considered incorrect. The perda titled “Protection of Kabupaten Blitar’s Migrant Workers in 
the Foreign Countries” implies that the local government has the power to deal with foreign 
countries, which is against its jurisdiction. This implication is also clear in Article 22 (1) of the 
perda, which requires the Disnakertrans to supervise Blitar migrant workers working overseas, 
a task that cannot be performed by the Disnakertrans. Second, the provisions on the 
protection commission have not been integrated with the rest of the provisions in the perda. 
On the contrary, it has raised new provisions on the existence of shelters for migrant workers. 
Third, there exists a contradiction in the party being in charge of protection. Article 27 (1) 
stipulates that the protection commission is in charge of protection, while Article 14 (1) states 
that the PPTKIS is the one that is responsible for the protection of migrant workers. Fourth, 
some provisions, such as those on class action, should have been ruled by the law and not by 
the perda. 
 
At present, the parliament is trying to revise the perda based on the assessment of the 
provincial labor agency. NGO activists are supporting this process, but since the financial 
support from UNIFEM has ended, it has to use its own limited resources. 
 
                                                      
14He was the one who gave the number of the perda, but, ironically, refused to book the perda in the kabupaten 
legislation book. Therefore, the perda was unenforceable.  
15Discussion with some officials at the labor agency on 21 June 2010. 
16Discussion with an SBMB activist (MS) on 21 June 2010. 
17Letter from the provincial secretary on behalf of the Governor of East Java No. 188/11173/013/2009 dated 31 
July 2009 concerning the Assessment of Blitar’s Perda No. 16/2008. 
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One similarity between the perda from Blitar and Lombok Barat lies in the fact that both 
stipulate the establishment of a protection commission at the kabupaten level.18 The formation 
of this independent body comes from the understanding that the Disnakertrans will not be 
able to solve problems alone. Meanwhile, problems at the kabupaten level require coordination 
with many institutions, even including those from other kabupaten or provinces. The 
protection commission is capable of doing this, as it is made up of independent professionals 
with the capacity of expediting solutions and mediating disputing parties in the area of 
overseas employment.19 In general, the establishment of the protection commission at the 
kabupaten level can help solve the abundant cases at the migrant-sending kabupaten and villages. 
 
Except for some trivialities, the protection commissions in Kabupaten Blitar and Lombok 
Barat are similar in terms of their establishment and general responsibilities. The only 
substantial difference lies in the fact that the protection commission in Blitar is established 
and selected by the parliament. This is due to the fact that the protection perda of Kabupaten 
Blitar is an initiative made by the parliament, while that of Kabupaten Lombok Barat is the 
executive’s initiative. We found during our fieldwork that perda which came from the 
executive’s initiative were much easier to be implemented compared to those coming from the 
legislative’s initiative. 
 
4.1.2 Kabupaten Lombok Barat20 
 
In 2006, local NGOs—Koslata and PPK—were committed to assist the local government to 
proceed with the protection perda. Funding for this initiative came from the European Union 
and Yayasan TIFA. The legal drafting process was done through a series of discussions at 
different levels. At the village level, PPK held discussions with prospective and former 
migrant workers, and their families, and relevant stakeholders at the village level. Five migrant-
source villages were picked out purposively, each conducted ten thematic discussions where 
problems were mapped and clustered, and their solutions were formulated. 
 
At the kabupaten and provincial levels, ten discussions were also held to follow up the findings 
at the village level. The discussions involved various stakeholders and the legal drafting team 
consisting of (i) Koslata and PPK; (ii) the Legal Department of the Bupati Office; (iii) head of 
the Disnakertrans; and (iv) academicians. The inclusion of these stakeholders is to ensure their 
sense of belonging. Finally, a public consultation was conducted with various PPTKIS before 
the public hearing with the local parliament. Lobbying the local parliament members was very 
important to convince them to finally agree with the raperda. 
 
The perda was legislated on 14 March 2008. However, the implementation of the perda was 
hampered by the kabupaten executive election and then the national elections. Following the 
kabupaten executive election, the administration was reshaped. Unfortunately, the selected head 
of the labor agency was a former camat (subdistrict head) who knew nothing about 
employment, let alone migrant workers. This worsened the implementation of the perda. 
                                                      
18In Kabupaten Blitar, the perda was still being revised, and, therefore, the protection commission had not been 
formed. In Kabupaten Lombok Barat, the perda had already come into force and the protection commission was 
inaugurated in October 2010. However, its existence had not been known by many stakeholders interviewed. The 
lack of socialization of the perda had been the concern of many NGO activists such as H (female, about 50 years 
old, 21 October 2010), MS (male, about 50 years old, 24 October 2010), and K (male, about 40 years old, 28 
October 2010). 
19Interview with MS (NGO activist, male, about 50 years old, 24 October 2010). 
20Interviews with S (Koslata officer, male, about 50 years old, 24 October 2010) and H (PPK officer, about 45 
years old, 21 October 2010). 
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4.1.3 Kabupaten Ponorogo 
 
From 2005 to 2006, Plan International, together with Social Protection Labor Network 
(JKPS) Cahaya, a local NGO, took the initiative to draft a protection perda.21 The overall 
process of legal drafting brought together some NGOs, local government officials, parliament 
members, and academicians. 
 
In 2006, the perda had come to its fourth revision. An officer of the Protection Commission 
on Women and Children explained that the cost had reached no less than Rp100 million, yet 
JKPS Cahaya failed to convince the Disnakertrans as well as the local parliament to agree with 
the draft.22 JKPS Cahaya held several demonstrations to push the local government to react. 
However, the Disnakertrans did not give any support to follow this up to the local parliament. 
At the same time, the local parliament was not interested in the substance of the perda. 
Therefore, the raperda was left unused until now. 
 
4.1.4 Kabupaten Lombok Tengah 
 
In Kabupaten Lombok Tengah, the preparation for the legal drafting began in 2004 when 
PPK, a local NGO, approached the labor agency to formulate the protection perda. Funding 
from this initiative came from TIFA Foundation. 
 
From 2005 to 2006, the discussion was intensified until the raperda reached its final version. 
However, the draft was rejected by the local parliament.23 One important reason of the 
rejection was that the substance of the perda was duplicating the PPTKI law and, therefore, it 
would be of no urgent use.24 
 
 
4.2 Comparing the Outcomes and Enabling Conditions in the Four Kabupaten 
 
4.2.1. Local Initiatives to Pass Protection Perda 
 
To retrieve information from the four visited kabupaten, we constructed Table 3. Some 
important highlights of the table are as follows. First, the duration of the policy process that is 
too short, such as one year in the case of Ponorogo, is certainly insufficient to advocate the 
protection perda. However, if it is too long, the policy process will encounter very frequent 
transfers of government staff which can significantly delay the success of the policy process 
                                                      
21Interviews with officers from PUSAR: CA (male, about 30 years old, 30 June 2010) and T (male, about 25 years 
old, 30 June 2010). The interview with JKPS Cahaya could not be carried out, as its office had moved out of 
Ponorogo. Even worse, CA said that JKPS Cahaya had closed its operation. Nevertheless, one of its former 
officers was invited (through PUSAR) to an FGD at the kabupaten level, but he left the discussion afterwards for 
an unknown reason. 
22Interview with an officer from the Protection Commission of Women and Children named R (female, about 30 
years old, 28 June 2010). 
23There are two versions of stories about who rejected the draft. According to an interview with Z (male, about 
40 years old, 29 October 2010), an officer from the Legal Department of the Bupati Office of Lombok Tengah, 
the local parliament was the one that rejected the law. However, according to an interview with an informant 
from the Kabupaten Lombok Tengah Disnakertrans named W (male, about 50 years old, 29 October 2010), the 
executive disagreed with the idea of having a protection perda. He said that he was one of the team members that 
criticized the raperda. 
24This information came from an informant from the Disnakertrans named W (male, about 50 years old, 29 
October 2010). 
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dan demotivate the morale of stakeholders. This is the case with Kabupaten Blitar where the 
successors were not familiar with the passed stages of the policy process. 
 
Second, the raperda of Kabupaten Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah that we reviewed reveal that 
they both fall into the type-3 perda of our typology. In other words, both regulate the 
placement rather than the protection of migrant workers. Since the raperda was similar to the 
PPTKI law, the executive and legislative in these two kabupaten were not interested in and did 
not show commitment to passing them.25 
 
Third, Blitar’s perda is the only local initiative which comes from the legislative side. Interviews 
with local parliament members disclosed that their involvement started only in 2006, three 
years after the onset of the protection perda project.26 Engagement with the local parliament 
was a smart solution, as the local government did not seem to agree with the protection perda 
in the first place. Unfortunately, even after the approval from the parliament, the perda could 
not be enforced, as it was not recorded in the kabupaten legislation book. 
 
Table 3. General Information on Local Initiatives to Pass Protection Perda 
 Blitar Lombok Barat Ponorogo Lombok Tengah 
Donor agency UNIFEM European Union, and 
Yayasan TIFA 
Plan International Yayasan TIFA 
Advocating NGOs SBMB, P3BM Yayasan Koslata, 
PPK 
JKPS Cahaya PPK 
Establishment of NGO SBMB in 2002 
 
Yayasan Koslata in 
1989, 
PPK in 1988 
Unknown, but 
dissolved in 2009  
PPK in 1988 
Duration of policy 
process 
2003–2008 2006–2008 2005–2006 2004–2006 
Legal drafting process 2007–2008 2006–2007 2005–2006 2005–2006 
Prolegda 2008 2007 Failed to be included 
in the 2007 Prolegda. 
Rejected by both the 
executive and 
legislative 
Failed to be included 
in the 2006 Prolegda. 
Rejected by both the 
executive and 
legislative 
Legislation date of 
perda  
18 December 2008b 
 
14 March 2008 --- --- 
Initiator of perda Legislative’s initiative Executive’s initiative Supposed to be the 
executive’s initiative 
Supposed to be the 
executive’s initiative 
Substance of perdaa Protection Protection Placement Placement 
aAuthor’s review. 
bIt was the date when the bupati signed the perda. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
25This information came from an interview with an informant from the Lombok Tengah Disnakertrans, W (male, 
about 50 years old, 29 October 2010). The same reason was also mentioned by informants from the Kabupaten 
Blitar Disnakertrans, namely HS (male, about 50 years old, 21 June 2010), Y (male, about 40 years old, 21 June 
2010), and R (male, about 40 years old, 21 June 2010), who rejected the protection perda. However, one should be 
careful with the statement “the perda is just copied and pasted from the PPTKI law”, as it could be just an excuse 
to reject a local initiative. 
26Interviews with parliament members: GT (male, about 40 years old, 22 June 2010) and S (female, about 40 years 
old, 22 June 2010). 
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4.2.2. Internal Factors 
 
We include factors such commitment, capacity, trust, position of the NGO, physical distance, 
and the intervention of PPTKIS to be the factors influencing relationship between the 
stakeholders. Table 4 compares four main stakeholders during the policy process: the local 
government, local parliament, advocating NGOs, and the PPTKIS. The local government, 
comprising the Disnakertrans, Legal Department of the Bupati Office, kabupaten secretary, and 
head of the Local Agency for Development Planning (Bappeda), is particularly important 
during the process, as it is the implementer of the perda.27 Therefore, the capacity of NGOs to 
convince them to join the policy process is very important.28 On the other hand, it is also 
crucial to get the parliament members’ approval of the raperda, to bring the raperda into the 
prolegda, and to legislate it. 
 
Table 4. General Information on Internal Factors: Stakeholders’ Perception 
 Blitar Lombok Barat Ponorogo Lombok Tengah 
Commitment of the 
local government 
Low High Low Low 
Commitment of the 
local parliament 
High Moderate Low Low 
Capacity of the 
advocating NGOs  
Good capacity to 
formulate legal 
drafting. Capacity to 
lobby the executive is 
not sufficient. 
Good capacity to 
formulate legal 
drafting. Good 
capacity to lobby 
the executive and 
legislative. 
Not known Good 
Trust, relationship, 
and interaction 
Distrust, low 
interaction, in 
particular between 
the NGO and 
Disnakertrans. Good 
relationship between 
the NGO and 
parliament members 
Trust, intensive 
interaction 
NGO not well 
known to 
stakeholders in 
Ponorogo. Low 
interaction 
between the NGO 
and other 
stakeholders 
Trust but not 
intensive 
interaction 
Position of the 
advocating NGOs 
Contestation Engagement Contestationa Engagement 
Physical distance 
between the NGO 
and the other 
stakeholders 
Close Close Far Far 
Intervention from the 
PPTKIS 
High Unaware Some members of 
the parliament 
own the PPTKIS 
Unaware 
aJKPS Cahaya held demonstrations several times, according to officers from PUSAR: CA (male, about 30 years old, 30 
June 2010) and T (male, about 25 years old, 30 June 2010). 
 
                                                      
27These officials were included in the legal drafting team. 
28The policy process in Lombok Barat was more systematic. Both Koslata and PPK were the “old players” in the 
development industry in NTB. Koslata is well known to have the capacity as an advocating NGO which has 
partnerships not only with the executive but also with the legislative, and not only at the kabupaten level but also 
at the provincial level. Therefore, resistance of their partners was minimal. In the case of Lombok Barat, the 
process of advocacy at the kabupaten level was done by Koslata, whereas the process of collecting aspiration from 
the village level was done by PPK, which has the capacity as a community empowerment NGO. 
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In the policy process, commitment is a must. Koslata and PPK, in particular, chose Lombok 
Barat to advocate the protection perda because they were certain that the Kabupaten 
Government of Lombok Barat had high commitment to protecting the migrant workers.29 
The commitment of the local government as well as the local parliament does not, however, 
stand on its own. It depends on the substance of the raperda, such as the case of Lombok 
Tengah. It also depends on the substantial and technical capacity of the NGOs to lobby and 
convince both the local government and the parliament to pass the perda. 
 
Nevertheless, low commitment can also simply be a lack of willingness and awareness of 
gender issues. This was expressed by a gender activist in Ponorogo.30 At the same time, the 
general mindset of the local government is that the placement and protection of migrant 
workers is the task of the central, and not the local, government. For example, an official 
interviewed believed that the local government at the time being could not arbitrarily establish 
the perda without the approval of the central and provincial governments.31 In the case of 
Lombok Tengah, an informant from the Disnakertrans was concerned that the perda would 
disturb the migration outflow which could further cause a high unemployment rate at the 
kabupaten level.32 The other informants said that the local government would not be able to 
protect the migrant workers in the destination countries, as it fell beyond its jurisdiction.33 In 
addition, many fear the insufficient budget and capacity to carry out the mandate of the perda.34 
In Lombok Barat, an informant from PPK was concerned that the Local Budget (APBD) had 
not been able to accommodate an increase in budget due to the increase in roles and 
responsibilities.35 In all the visited kabupaten, it was observed that the Disnakertrans appeared 
to have only a limited budget, which could be the main reason of its low commitment and the 
reason to maintain status quo. 
 
Furthermore, the position that the advocating NGOs take in their relation with local 
counterparts is important. In particular, this relationship must not end once the perda is 
legislated. Instead, it should remain during the implementation of the perda. SBMB and P3BM 
tend to take a contestation (contesting) position, i.e., to push from the outside, while NGOs in 
NTB are likely to engage and work together with local partners. We observe that in East Java, 
frictions between NGOs and the local government are still apparent. In NTB, particularly in 
Lombok Barat, the local government is quite open to NGO participation in policymaking 
                                                      
29Interview with MS (NGO activist, male, about 50 years old, 23 October 2010). 
30Interview with an informant from the Local Commission on the Protection of Women and Children named R 
(female, about 30 years old, 28 June 2010). 
31Interview with an informant from the Legal Department of the Bupati Office of Ponorogo named ME (male, 
about 50 years old, 28 June 2010) and interviews with informants from the Kabupaten Blitar Disnakertrans who 
rejected the protection perda: HS (male, about 50 years old, 21 June 2010), Y (male, about 40 years old, 21 June 
2010), and R (male, about 40 years old, 21 June 2010). 
32Interview with an informant from the Kabupaten Lombok Tengah Disnakertrans named W (male, about 50 
years old, 29 October 2010). 
33Interview with an informant from the Legal Department of the Bupati Office of Lombok Tengah named Z 
(male, about 50 years old, 29 October 2010) and interviews with informants from the Kabupaten Blitar 
Disnakertrans who rejected the protection perda: HS (male, about 50 years old, 21 June 2010), Y (male, about 40 
years old, 21 June 2010), and R (male, about 40 years old, 21 June 2010). 
34Interview with an informant from the Bappeda of Ponorogo named M (male, about 50 years old, 28 June 2010). 
35In 2010, the budget of the protection commission came from the Revised APBD, the sustainability of which 
was in question. 
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thanks to the development of trust over some decades.36 Trust is, therefore, vital to the 
success of perda legislation. 
 
Additionally, the physical distance between the advocating NGOs and the local counterparts is 
another factor that influences the interaction of both parties. In the case of Lombok Tengah, 
PPK is located in Mataram, about two hours of travel from Praya, the capital city of Lombok 
Tengah. On the contrary, in the case of Lombok Barat and Blitar, the stakeholders are 
physically close to each other. 
 
The involvement of the PPTKIS is another issue to consider. The advocating NGOs in 
Lombok Barat deliberately excluded the PPTKIS from the policy process. The reason was 
straightforward: Almost all the PPTKIS were profit-oriented and would only hamper the 
overall process. Koslata and PPK unanimously agreed to exclude them in the legal drafting. 
The PPTKIS were only invited to the public consultation at the end of the process.37 Because 
of this, the PPTKIS were not aware of the perda in Lombok Barat.38 In Ponorogo, the 
intervention of the PPTKIS was serious. In 2006, the raperda was submitted to be included in 
the 2007 Prolegda. Many of the parliament members who were known to own a PPTKIS and 
to have relatives owning PPTKIS rejected the raperda.39 In Blitar, the PPTKIS were against the 
discussion of the raperda in the parliament (The Institute for Ecosoc Rights and Trade Union 
Rights Center, 2008). They threatened to move out of Blitar if the raperda was passed. 
 
4.2.3. External Factors 
 
External factors are the factors out of the control of the stakeholders, including election time, 
transfer of government staff, finance from donor agencies, and other incentives (table 5). 
 
Table 5. General Information on External Factors: Stakeholders’ Perception 
 Blitar Lombok Barat Ponorogo Lombok Tengah 
Timing  of the legislative 
election 
5 April 2004 
6 March 2009 
5 April 2004 
6 March 2009 
5 April 2004 
6 March 2009 
5 April 2004 
6 March 2009 
Timing  of the executive election 27 November 2005 
9 November 2010 
20 October 2005 
30 October 2008 
(first round) 
15 December 2008 
(second round) 
20 June 2005 
3 July 2010 
27 June 2005 
7 June 2010 (first 
round) 
23 September 
2010 (second 
round) 
Transfer of staff Very frequent. 
Newcomers not 
fitting the job 
Frequent. 
Newcomers not 
fitting the job 
Moderately 
frequent. 
Newcomers not 
fitting the job 
Very frequent. 
Newcomers not 
fitting the job 
 
                                                      
36The history of NGO movement in NTB dates back to 1982 (Dahlan, 2000), which is much earlier than the 
NGO movement in East Java. 
37Interview with MS (NGO activist, male, about 50 years old, 23 October 2010). 
38Interviews with informants from the PPTKIS in Lombok Barat, namely A (male, about 30 years old, 21 
October 2010), FA (female, about 50 years old, 22 October 2010), and T (male, about 40 years old, 26 October 
2010). 
39Interview with an officer from the Protection Commission of Women and Children named R (female, about 30 
years old, 28 June 2010). 
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 Blitar Lombok Barat Ponorogo Lombok Tengah 
Finance from donor agencies Sufficient; donor 
could finance long 
policy process. 
More than 
sufficient. The 
policy process 
involved intensive 
and extensive 
discussions at the 
village and 
kabupaten levels, 
lobby, public 
consultation, and 
campaign. 
Insufficient, no 
more effort after 
rejection 
Insufficient, no 
more effort after 
rejection 
Other incentives or disincentives The local parliament 
has the incentive to 
win the Jawa Post 
Autonomy Award. 
--- --- --- 
 
The importance external factors is very clear in the case of Kabupaten Blitar and Lombok 
Tengah where political events give advantage to the political process and enhance the 
approval of perda (table 6) 
 
Table 6. Political Events in Kabupaten Blitar and Lombok Barat 
Political Events Blitar Lombok Barat 
Year of Prolegda 2008 2007 
Date of perda legislation 18 December 2008  14 March 2008 
Date of legislative election 6 March 2009 6 March 2009 
Other JPIP Autonomy Award  
 
In Blitar, the prolegda took place in 2008. The next “supposed” legislation date of the perda was 
18 December 2008, which was coincidental with the international migrant day. The incumbent 
members of parliament had enough to prove their support to the migrant workers prior to the 
legislative election, which was on 6 March 2009. In Lombok Barat, the perda entered into the 
prolegda in 2007 and was officially legislated on 14 March 2008, prior to legislative election on 6 
March 2009. In migrant-source kabupaten, the incumbents could use policies in favour of 
migrant workers to gain vote from them. Therefore, in these two kabupaten, the timing of the 
policy process gave incentive to the legislative members to commit themselves to the 
legislation of the perda.  
 
Unfortunately, the favorable election timing in Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah did not concur 
with the policy process. The legislative members in Blitar were also encouraged by the 
Autonomy Award  of the Jawa Post Institute. The award was given to the local parliament 
after completing the policy process of protection perda, which was the legislative’s initiative. 
 
The election time might be a good incentive to the legislation. However, to NGOs in Lombok 
Barat, the election time was seen as a barrier to implementation. The perda had been legislated 
in 14 March 2008, but due to the election events, progress of its implementation was very 
slow.40 Following the election, the administration was changed and, therefore, transfer of staff 
took place. The new officers chosen were not necessarily the ones who understood the issues 
in their new jobs. Again, this had impede the implementation. 
 
                                                      
40Interview with an informant from PPK named H (female, about 40 years old, 21 October 2010). 
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The transfer of government staff was unanimously considered to weaken public service 
delivery. This was the concern of not only NGOs but also government officers. The transfer 
not only happens too often but also does not consider the qualifications of the new staff. 
Eventually, this reshaping of administration only weakens the public services, making people 
suffer, instead of advancing them. Indeed, no one benefits from unnecessary transfer of staff, 
except the rent seekers. 
 
Last but certainly not least, the financial support from donor agencies is apparently a very 
important element in the policy process. The local innovative idea to protect migrant workers 
at the migrant-sending kabupaten requires funding. Without sufficient funding, local NGOs 
alone would not succeed. In the case of Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah, the duration of 
funding was very limited. Once the raperda was rejected to enter the proledga, the funding 
stopped. On the contrary, in Blitar, donors were able to extend their support so that the 
raperda could finally obtain approval from the legislative. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Overseas employment has been in the grey area as to whether it should be centralized or 
decentralized. Two most important legal frameworks—the PPTKI law and Government 
Regulation No. 38/2007—both characterize centralistic governance, with placement, rather 
than protection, of migrant workers dominating the provisions. In terms of placement, the 
PPTKI law assigns the BNP2TKI, a vertical body with many units of service centers and 
posts at the provincial and kabupaten/kota levels under its authority, to handle the G-to-G 
deployment (Articles 10 and 92 (2a)) and the PPTKIS the P-to-P deployment (Article 10). 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007 assigns the central government the tasks of giving 
numerous permits and licensing PPTKIS. In terms of protection, the PPTKI law is in charge 
of the preplacement protection (Article 82). 
 
With this centralistic management, the central government faces a lot of difficulties in dealing 
with 80% of the problems which apparently occur in the migrant-sending kabupaten/kota and 
villages. This is true because the PPTKI law is considered to be particularly weak in 
supervision. First, supervisory roles are assigned to governments at all levels, including the 
local government (Article 92(1)) and the BNP2TKI (Article 95). On the other hand, the 
delineation of authority between governments at all levels and the BNP2TKI is far from clear. 
Moreover, this triggers the question of whether supervisory fund is also shared with 
kabupaten/kota where the BNP2TKI has no representatives, except the small service posts in 
14 kabupaten/kota. Second, provisions on supervision (Article 92(3)) and supervisory 
mechanisms (Article 93) are yet to be completed. The PPTKI law promises to issue the 
implementing legislation, but so far it fails to do so. Third, supervision becomes more difficult 
to carry out at the kabupaten/kota level as the branch office could not be held responsible for 
any activities happening at the field (Article 23).  
 
To add to these complications, Government Regulation No. 38/2007 gives even more 
intensive responsibilities, some of which are the tasks previously assigned by the PPTKI law 
to the PPTKIS, to the local government, while some others are duties to support the central 
government’s responsibilities which are not mentioned in the PPTKI law. This poses the 
following two questions: To what extent is the local government aware of and committed to 
performing these extended tasks? And is it capable of performing them? 
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In answering these questions, one should refer to the performance of kabupaten/kota in the 
decentralization era. Not surprisingly, some kabupaten/kota believe that autonomy has opened 
new opportunities to take initiative and improve public services. But many also see autonomy 
as a vehicle to collect local revenues by means of issuing perda on local taxes and retribusi. 
Indeed, employment is one of the areas to extract levies. Many of the perda related to overseas 
employment do violate Law No. 28/2009 concerning Local Taxes and Retribusi. They also 
violate Law No. 13/2003 concerning Labor, and Presidential Regulation No. 36/2002 
concerning the Ratification of ILO Convention No. 88 concerning Organization of 
Employment Service. Yet, for many kabupaten/kota, the freedom to issue perda has been 
wrongly understood as a symbol of independence from the central government. 
 
We collected 127 perda from 115 kabupaten/kota which are related to overseas employment. In 
order to map them according to the kabupaten’s/kota’s number of migrant workers, we 
constructed a typology as follows: type-1 perda: perda on general employment which is 
extractive; type-2 perda: perda on general kabupaten/kota revenue which is extractive; type-3 
perda: perda on placement procedure which is nonextractive; and type-4 perda: perda on 
protection which is nonextractive. We found that out of the 127 perda, 81% fall in type-1 perda; 
14.2% in type-2 perda; and 2.4% in type-3 and type-4 perda. In 82 migrant-source 
kabupaten/kota, only 3 kabupaten (3.7%) have protection perda (type-4 perda). 
 
We also performed a mapping analysis where we found that migrant-source kabupaten/kota 
issue both a higher number and variety of perda related to overseas employment. We found 
that some kabupaten/kota with very low or even no migrant workers, passed type-1 and type-2 
perda. These are transit kabupaten/kota located at the border with neighboring receiving 
countries, such as Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore. Many prospective migrant workers and the 
PPTKIS require administrative services from the government of these kabupaten/kota. At the 
same time, it is not surprising if irregular migration activities also take place in these 
kabupaten/kota. Interestingly, this mapping exercise found that our typology is not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Kabupaten/kota that passed protection perda, such as Kabupaten Sumbawa 
and Lombok Barat, passed extractive perda as well. This implies that these kabupaten might 
have had good intention to protect their migrant workers but, at the same time, charged the 
workers either directly or indirectly, which is against the law. The only mutually exclusive case 
is Kabupaten Blitar which only passed protection perda and none of the extractive types. 
 
From the mapping analysis, we also learn that the majority of migrant-source kabupaten/kota 
are not ready to commit themselves to protecting their migrant workers. However, some 
kabupaten/kota are. We selected four kabupaten—Kabupaten Blitar, Ponorogo, Lombok Barat, 
and Lombok Tengah—for our benchmarking study. All of them had been given technical 
assistance through NGOs to formulate protection perda. Only Blitar and Lombok Barat 
managed to pass the perda. Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah were not ready to do so. 
 
So, what makes some kabupaten/kota able to pass the protection perda? In order to understand 
this phenomenon, we looked at the internal factors and external factor.  
 
Our field research showed that each case is unique. That is why the outcome cannot be 
explained in a standard model that applies for each observed kabupaten. The duration of the 
policy process, for example, was too short for Ponorogo, which appeared to be insufficient to 
pass the perda and was too long for Blitar that it concurred with transfers of staff several times, 
even if finally the perda was issued. However, the optimal duration for Lombok Barat, which 
was two years, turned out not to be optimal for Lombok Tengah. 
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The substance of the perda was one of the reasons why the government of Kabupaten 
Lombok Tengah decided not to proceed with the insertion of raperda into the prolegda. 
Apparently, the substance which was similar to the substance of the PPTKI law could not 
attract the attention of the stakeholders. However, the substance of the perda in Blitar was 
innovative and became the reason why the local government and the PPTKIS were resistant 
against it. 
 
The advocating NGOs in Blitar and Ponorogo took the position of policy contestation with 
Blitar being successful, thanks to the willingness of the local parliament to tap this aspiration, 
and Ponorogo being unsuccessful. In the case of Lombok Barat, the position of policy 
engagement of the NGOs proved to be more effective, although this was not the situation in 
Lombok Tengah. 
 
The intervention of the PPTKIS was clear in East Java, resulting in the policy process being 
disturbed. In Ponorogo, the PPTKIS was known to block the inclusion of raperda into the 
prolegda through members of the parliament who own a PPTKIS or are closely related to the 
PPTKIS. In Blitar, the intervention of the PPTKIS could be counterbalanced by the high 
commitment of members of the parliament and, therefore, the raperda could be approved. In 
NTB, the PPTKIS was not aware of the raperda. With this favorable context, the perda in 
Lombok Barat succeeded to be legislated, but not in Lombok Tengah. 
 
The timing of election at the kabupaten/kota level turned to be advantageous in approving the 
perda in some cases. This was the case of Blitar and Lombok Barat, but not the case of 
Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah. However, the timing of election could also be detrimental in 
the implementation of perda. In Lombok Barat, the legislated perda had to wait until the 
election events were over. 
 
Apart from the above mentioned factors, we also found that (i) trust and commitment of the 
local government and local parliament, (ii) strong capacity of NGOs, and (iii) strong support 
of the donor agencies are common factors that positively influence the success of perda 
legislation. The commitment of the local government, in particular, is essential in the 
implementation phase. Therefore, engaging them from the onset will enable an effective 
execution of the mandate of the perda. At the same time, transfer of government staff that is 
too often and without fit and proper consideration is damaging the public service delivery, 
including the protection of migrant workers. Finally, strong support of the donor agencies is 
equally essential since local NGOs alone would not be able to encourage the local government 
to protect the migrant workers. 
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